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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper presents some evidence on the correlation between 
profits and market share in Spanish manufacturing firms, at the industry 
level . The interest of this correlation is that a broad class of oligopolistic 
models is consistent with a positive correlation between these two 
variables. Establishing the correlation as a stylized fact would be useful 
as a guide to theoretical work, and would allow some insight into market 
behaviour in Spanish manufacturing over the period considered. 
Market share is one of the variables widely used in empirical 
studies of structure and performance to explain differences in 
profitability among firms . Schmalensee ( 1989) points out the mixed 
evidence on the correlation between these two variables .  On the one 
hand. studies foliowing Weiss (1 974) include both industry concentration 
and firm market share in the same equation, and support the following: 
"In samples of US firms or business units that include many 
industries, market share is strongly correlated with 
profitability; the coefficient of concentration is generally 
negative or insignificant in regressions including market share" 
(Schmalensee (1989). page 984) 
On the other hand, intra-industry studies by several authors 
support the view that: 
"Within particular manufacturing industries, profitability is not 
generally strongly related to market share" ( Schmalensee 
( 1 989) .  page 984) 
It has been suggested that these two facts are compatible if 
estimates supporting the positive correlation of market share and 
profitability are dominated by a small number of industries with a strong 
positive correlation. Heterogeneous behaviour among industries J on the 
other hand, should be expected since individual industry idiosyncrasies 
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are likely to be important, as suggested by the new empirical industrial 
organization literature. 
In Spanish manufacturing. Maz6n (1993) found a positive 
correlation between profitability and market share, with a sample 
including many industries. The coefficient of concentration was positive 
and significant as opposed to US evidence. 
In this paper, using an unbalanced panel covering 1 , 396 firms 
over the period 1983-89, from the "Central de Balances del Banco de 
Espanall, estimation of a profit equation for each industry in the data is 
attempted, in order to verify if the second fact presented by Schmalensee 
is confirmed, and to draw some inferences about market behaviour in 
Spanish manufacturing. 
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the 
theoretical model; section 3 describes the data set used; section 4 
discusses some econometric problems; section 5 presents the results; 
section 6 reports some additional experiments; and section 7 summarizes 
the main implications of this study. 
2. THEORETICAL MODEL AND ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION 
Following Cowling and Waterson ( 1976 ) ,  consider an industry 
with N firms. Let p(X) be the inverse demand curve, where p is the 
market price and X the industry product, X = Xl + x2 + • • •  + X.' Suppose 
that the industry is in long run equilibrium, and C(x1) is the cost for firm 
i of producing x,. The economic profit of firm I is given by 
n,(x,) = p(X) x, - C(x,) (1) 
and the first order condition implies 
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P E 
(2) 
where c1 is marginal cost, not necessarily constant; E = -p(X)/(Xp'(X» 
is the absolute value of market elasticity; Ai = ax_/roc.i is the conjectural 
variation of firm i, showing how total output of all firms but i, X_i, 
changes with output of firm i, Xi; and 51 = xi/X is firm its market share. 
In order to estimate equation (2), different approaches can be 
taken concerning two subjects. First of all, concerning the left hand term 
of equation (2), (p-c,)/p, a measure of profitability; marginal cost and 
often prices are not observable and therefore they should be inferred 
from data or otherwise, an appropriate approximation should be used. 
Secondly, concerning conjectural variations; classical models of oligopoly 
correspond to certain values for A1, and could be considered as 
benchmarks. For example, Cournot, the non collusive equilibrium in 
quantities, implies Ai ; 0 for all i, and joint profit maximization, the 
collusive equilibrium that yields maximum joint profit, implies 1i ; 1/s1 -
1. But it is not clear what values of Ai correspond to other collusive 
equilibria. Therefore Ai should be estimated or and "ad hoc" 
characterization could be used. The choice between these two subjects 
usually distinguishes between studies belonging to the "new empirical 
industrial organization" and to "empirical studies of structure and performance" . 
A typical study in the new empirical industrial organization 
literature1 would estimate both profitability and conjectural variations, 
proposing an econometric study of an industry. Individual industry 
idiosyncrasies would be taken into account, and would affect the optimal 
strategy to estimate equation (2). These studies consider one industry at 
a time, and are beyond the scope of this paper. 
1 See Bresnahan (1989) for a survey on this topic. 
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On the other hand, empirical studies of structure and 
performance2 use accounting rates of return as a measure of profitability 
and an "ad hoc" characterization of conjectural variations. This is the 
strategy used in this paper, which limits the interpretation of results: 
they should be considered empirical regularities. 
The approximation used for (p-c1)/p, is firm ils price-cost 
margin, PCM1J defined by Collins and Preston 0968, 1969) as revenue 
minus variable cost divided by revenue. In equation ( 2 ) , variable cost is 
used to approximate marginal cost), and multiplying numerator and 
denominator by x1, the left hand side of equation ( 2 )  is the price-cost 
margin. In addition, fixed costs are included; if firm i uses capital K1 and 
the rate of return on invested capital is p, equation (2)  yields 
PCM, p 
K, 
VP, 
+ � ( 1  + A,) s, 
e 
where we obtain an expression of firm ils price-cost margin. 
(3) 
Following Schmalensee (1987) , the "ad hoc" characterization of 
conjectural variations used is 
1 A, = A + y (s, - _ ) 
N 
(4) 
where l is the average of industry conjectural variations; y is a constant; 
and N is the number of firms in the industry. The rationale for equation 
(4)  is that it is consistent both with the Stigler ( 1964) hypothesis that 
small firms have lower conjectural variations than their larger rivals 
(y)O). since they have a lower risk of detection than large firms when 
deviating from an implicit or explicit market agreement; and with the 
Clarke and Davies ( 1 982) hypothesis that large firms have smaller 
2 See Schmalensee {1989} for a survey on this topic. 
) This approximation is appropriate if there are constant returns to scale in 
the relevant range. 
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conjectural variations tpan their smaller rivals (y<O) , since they think 
that rivals do not have the capacity to respond to their changes in 
output' , 
Substituting equation (4) into equation ( 3 )  and including time 
subscripts yields 
K" 
p -­
VP1t 
(5) 
where a1 is a firm specific effect5, to capture time-invariant unobservable 
determinants of profits, such as management style; at are time dummy 
variables, to capture the effect of industry specific variables such as 
import penetration, advertising expenditures, R&D, etc., usually 
included in this type of regressions, plus economy wide variables that 
could be affecting the evolution of price-cost margins such as the 
introduction of VAT in 1986; and u1t is a white noise residual. 
Equation (5)  considers explicitly the fact that the demand 
elasticity, E, and the mean conjectural variation, A, could vary with time, 
Concerning demand elasticity, it is often assumed to be time invariant, 
bu t even if the demand curve does not change, movements along it would 
imply a variation on demand elasticity, unless constant elasticity is 
assumed, Concerning the mean conjectural variation, A, traditional models 
of oligopoly would argue that it varies with industry concentration or 
import penetration; on the other hand, repeated game models of oligopoly 
behaviour such as Green and Porter (1984) and Rotemberg and Saioner 
( 1986) are compatible with changes in conjectural variations over time, 
since they consider demand shocks that affect collusive agreeme�ts on the 
industry, The strategy used here is to capture variations on both demand 
elasticity and the mean conjectural variation using a time dummy variable 
at' Since information on the number of firms on the industry at time t, Nt, 
, Note that (S, - I/N) is positive if firm i is "big" and negative if firm I is 
"small" , 
, Cub bin and Geroski ( 1987), Scott and Pascoe ( 1986) and Kessides ( 1 987) 
have detected significant firm-specific effects, 
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is not available, it would also be included in the time dummy. Rearranging 
equation (5) , with atsit :::; 1/EtO + At - y/Nt)Sit and atsit2 :::; YSit2/EtJ 
yields 
p (6) 
Equation (6) is estimated for each industry on the data. Since 
many "ad hoc" assumptions have been made, it should be clear that 
estimates of equation (6) will be interpreted only as empirical 
regularities. Note that if the set of variables ats1t2 is not jointly 
significant but Sit 2 is, it would imply that demand elasticity is constant 
over the period considered; therefore, if the set of variables atsit is 
jointly significant, time changes in the coefficient on market share, Sit' 
would be due either to changes in the mean conjectural variations or to 
changes in the number of firms in the industry, Nt• 
3. DATA EMPLOYED 
The main data source for this study is an unbalanced panel 
covering 1 , 396 private manufacturing firms from the "Central de Balances 
del Banco de Espafia" (CBBE), over the period 1983-89. CBBE is a yearly 
survey with balance sheet and complementary information, but its 
completion by firms is not compulsory. Industry data from the "Encuesta 
Industrial'f, by the flInstituto Nacional de Estadisticalt (lNE) are also 
used. The data appendix details the selection of firms and variables 
cons truction. 
From the original data, 1 , 1 1 1  firms were selected, belonging to 
22 sectors with more than 20 firms. They account for nearly 80% of 
available firms. Table 1 presents a list of the sectors and a summary of 
statistics for selected variables. 
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4. ECONOMETRIC PROBLEMS 
In order to estimate equation (6)  t first differences are used, 
since the firm-specific effect (ai) is unobservable and correlated with the 
independent variables, and could be affecting profitability. 
The main problem with the estimation of equation (6) is that 
pointed out by the critics of cross-section studies on structure and 
performance: all the variables included in the regression are endogenous J 
and there are no theoretically exogenous variables to be used as 
instruments; given the complexity of market structure, it is difficult to 
argue for the exclusion of any variable from the structural equation. 
The use of panel data could be a solution to the problem: lagged 
independent variables could be used as instruments. Nevertheless, as 
pointed out by Schmalensee (1989), one should keep in mind that equation 
(6) is a long run equilibrium equation. Lagged independent variables 
would be appropriate instruments only if departures from long-run 
equilibrium are random; if not, residuals will be serially correlated and 
lagged variables would not be appropriate instruments. 
It is difficult to argue that the Spanish manufacturing sector was 
in long-run equilibrium during the period considered, 1983-89. It is a well 
known fact that many industries were (and probably still are) undergoing 
structural change as a result, among other factors, of the increase in 
international competition due to the Spanish European Community 
membership. Nevertheless, and in the absence of a suitable model of 
disequilibrium, the strategy used Is to estimate equation (6) with lagged 
independent variables as instruments, and use the standard tests to 
establish the validity of instruments. 
The model is estimated using the General Method of Moments 
(GMM) procedure, proposed by Arellano and Bond ( 1 991 ) ,  and contained 
in their DPD package. The instruments used are t-2 lags of firm i's 
revenue (VP,) and market share (s,). Lagged values of firm i's capital 
(K1) are not considered appropriate instruments due to measurement 
problems. 
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5 .  ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 
Equations for 22 sectors with 20 or more firms were estimated. It 
should be pointed out that the data only include firms with a single 
corporate activity, since it is not clear how to treat multiproduct firms. 
For each of the 22 industries, different versions of equation (6)  
were estimated i n  first differences, including time dummies interactively 
(i) with market share, to capture the effect of any industry variable 
affecting average conjectural variations, changes in demand elasticity J or 
changes in the number of firms; and (il) with market share squared, to 
capture changes in demand elasticity. Different versions were obtained 
setting equal to zero one or more of the coefficients, when variables were 
not significant. 
For twelve of the 22 industries, "acceptabletl equations were 
estimated, meaning equations with first order serial correlation, without 
second order serial correlation and for which the Sargan test of 
overidentifying restrictions on the instruments is accepted. Table 2 
presents one equation for each industry, the one for which the maximum 
number of variables is significant6 and standard tests accepted at the 5% 
significance level. 
Results show heterogeneous behaviour across industries, 
probably due to individual idiosyncrasies. The main findings are 
summarized in the following facts: 
1) The coefficient on the capital-revenue ratio (K,JVP,,) -the rate of 
return on invested capital-, though predicted to be positive and 
significant, only is so in two sectors, Meat Products and Leather. Four 
sectors, Industrial Machinery, Graphic Arts, Vegetable Products and 
Electronic Materials, have a negative and significant coefficient. This 
result is not new: as pointed out by Schmalensee (1989 ) ,  significant 
negative estimates have been reported by a number of authors, i.e. 
Ornstein ( 1975 ) ,  Liebowitz (1982) and Domowitz, Hubbard and Petersen 
'Other than K,JVP", which theoretically should be significant in all models. 
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( 1 986) with US data. Machin and Van Reenen ( 1991)  also obtained a 
negative and significant coefficient in a panel data analysis of UK 
manufacturing firms. Measurement errors could explain this result. 
2} Eight industries, Consumer Chemicals, Industrial Chemicals, 
Industrial Machinery, Graphic Arts, Meat Products, Vegetable 
Products, Leather and Footwear, show a positive correlation between 
market share (s,,) and profitability (PCM,,), and four of them, Metallic 
Products, Electronic Materials, Paper and Plastic and Rubbers, a 
negative one. Schmalensee ( 1987) found a positive correlation on 60% 
of industries for 1967, but only on 22.9%  on 1972. Clarke, Davies and 
Waterson ( 1 984) found a positive correlation for 40% of industries using 
data over 1971 - 77. These results are comparable to the 3 6 . 4 %  of 
industries with positive correlation found here. 
3) The coefficient on market share squared (Slt
2) is significant in 
eleven industries. For two industries, Meat Products and Plastic and 
Rubbers, the coefficient changes over time, suggesting that demand 
elasticity changes over the period considered. For six industries, 
Consumer Chemicals, Industrial Machinery, Graphic Arts, Vegetable 
Products, Leather and Footwear, the coefficient is negative and 
therefore supports the Clarke and Davies hypothesis that large firms 
have smaller conjectural variations than their rivals. And for the three 
remaining industries, Metallic Products, Electronic Materials and 
Paper, the coefficient is positive, supporting the Stigler hypothesis 
that small firms have a lower risk of detection than larger firms when 
deviating from a market agreement, and lower conjectural variations. 
4) For five of the twelve industries, Graphic Arts, Vegetable Products, 
Metallic Products, Electronic Materials and Paper, the coefficients on 
the set of variables 0tSit are jointly significant at the 5% level, the 
coefficient on Sit
2 is significant but the coefficients on the set of 
variables 0tSlt
2 are not. The fact that the coefficient on Sit
2 does not 
change over time suggests that demand elasticity is constant over the 
period considered. Therefore the variation over time of the coefficient 
on Sit is due either to changes in the number of firms in the industry, 
Nt, or to changes on average conjectural variations, At' that could be 
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interpreted as a measure of market power. Changes in At could be due 
to changes in industry concentration or import penetration, or due to 
shocks in demand that alter collusive behaviour as proposed by 
repeated game models. Since the number or firms in the industry, 
concentration and import penetration are variables that change 
smoothly over time, but estimated coefficients on Sit change abruptly 
for most of the sectors, the results suggest that shocks in demand 
could be altering collusive behaviour, as proposed by repeated game 
models. 
5 )  For two of the twelve sectors, Meat Products and Plastic and 
Rubbers, both the coefficients on the set of variables atSit and QtSit2 
are significant at the 5% level. Therefore demand elasticity varies over 
the period considered, and it is not possible to conclude whether 
conjectural variations change over time. 
6} For one sector, Industrial Chemicals, the coefficient on the set of 
variables atsit are significant at the 5% level and neither Sit2 nor atsit2 
are. Therefore variations on time of the coefficient on Sit could be due 
to changes on demand elasticity, the number of firms in the industry 
or mean conjectural variations. 
Table 3 includes a list of the ten sectors for which it was not 
possible to obtain acceptable equations. For some of those sectors, 
heterogeneity could be the reason why it is not possible to do so: for 
example, "Motor Vehicles" includes not only automobile factories but also 
parts and accessories, but the "Encuesta IndustriaP' does not offer more 
disaggregated data. For others, such as tlTextilestl, it is clear they were 
not in long-run equilibrium over the period considered. 
6. ADDITIONAL TESTS 
6.1. Accounting rate of return on assets as the dependent variable 
The dependent v�riable in this paper is the price-cost margin, 
a proxy for the return on sales. Several authors, including Schmalensee 
( 1 987 ) , use the return on assets, multiplying equation (3) by revenue 
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over capital (VPi/Ki). Because of measurement errors on capital, the use 
of the return on assets implies that all variables in the regression present 
measurement problems, but only one does if return on sales is used. 
Empirically, equations using the return on assets as a dependent 
variable fail to pass tests for serial correlation in all industries (except 
one or two. depending on variables Included). 
6.2. Estimation of 1, for each firm in each industry 
Assuming time invariant conjectural variations, an estimate of a 
firm specific coefficient on market share could be obtained. Following 
Holtz-Eskin et al. ( 1988). this could be done writing equation (3) in 
pseudodifferences, with a two-step procedure. Unfortunately, when this 
was tried, estimates of p, the key parameter to recover Ai' were not 
acceptable for most of the industries (i.e., negative and significant 
values of p were obtained, when positive ones were expected'). These 
results could be due to measurement problems on capital, as well as to the 
fact that conjectural variations are not time invariant as assumed. 
6.3. Inclusion of additional variables 
Some additional variables were included in the basic regression, 
trying to obtain acceptable equations for sectors for which equation (6) 
is rejected. Inclusion of firms' exports over revenue in the estimated 
models made little difference: none of the equations with serial correlation 
problems improved as a result of the inclusion of the variable. The 
predominantly negative sign of the coefficient' should be highlighted. 
indicating lower profits for exporting firms. Lagged growth rates in 
revenue were also included, as Schmalensee ( 1989) points out that this 
variable almost always "workslt statistically) but it was not significant in 
most of the sectors and it did not solve serial correlation problems. 
7 Note that this result was also obtained In the model reported in section 5. 
, The coeficient is negative and significant for two sectors without serial 
correlation problems, and for three sectors showing serial correlation. 
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6.4. Recovering lit 
In equation (6), 
Therefore, 
and aggregating over firms in each sector, 
(7) 
where Atm and Stili are time means for each sector. 
Using equation (7) it is possible to recover estimated values for 
(1 + Atm)JEt• Since "ad hoc" approximations have been used, this should 
be considered as an exercise, since it is difficult to defend a structural 
interpretation of the estimated parameters. Following Bresnahan ( 1 989) , 
those estimates should be interpreted as a measure of average 
collusiveness of conduct in a given industry, since they capture what 
firms do as a result of expectations about rivals' reactions. Since collusion 
means a positive or null correlation between profits and market share, 
they are calculated for the eight industries that show a positive relation 
between those variables. Table 4 shows the mean estimated values of ( 1  
+ Atlll) let' calculated using equation (7) for each year and then averaging 
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over time9• Table 4 also shows, for demand elasticity equal to one10, 
values of ( 1  + Atm)/et in the case of Cournot behaviour (Ait = 0) and joint 
profit maximization (Ait = 1 - l/sit)' that should be considered as 
benchmarks. The fourth column of table 4 shows ( 1  + A:)/E, when joint 
profit maximization and Cournot are normalized to 100 and 1, 
respectively. 
Table 4 shows that estimated values of the conjectural variation 
term are equal to or under 23 for all sectors when the joint profit 
maximization and Cournot are normalized to 100 and 1 ,  respectively, 
indicating that the average co11usiveness for Spanish firms is low over the 
period considered, since estimated conjectural variations are closer to 
Cournot than to joint profit maximization. 
6.5 Inclusion of concentration and import penetration multiplying SiC 
Concentration and import penetration multiplying Sit were 
introduced in addition to Sit and substituting multiplying time dummies 
into equation (6) , since it is plausible that the mean conjectural variation, 
At' changes with these variables. 
Assuming that At' the mean conjectural variation for the 
industry, can be expressed as 
where CRt is time t concentration and IMP t is time t import penetration, 
equation (5)  yields 
' Two of the eight industries have a negative value of (1+A, )/E for one year. 
Those values are not included in the average. t t 
10 For the Spanish economy, only estimated elasticities for consumer demands 
are avalaible. For example, Brlones, Estrada and Hernando ( 1993) estimate 
demand elasticity for twelve commodity groups, and it is less than one in absolute 
value for all of them. Possibly a higher disaggregation would imply higher demand 
elasticity. 
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(8) 
In equation (8), B2 is expected to be positive since an increase 
in concentration would facilitate collusive agreements, increasing 
conjectural variations; and 63 negative, since an increase in import 
penetration would increase competition, lowering conjectural variations. 
When equation (8) is estimated, in first differences and using the 
same set of instruments reported on Table 2, three of the twelve sectors 
do not pass first order correlation tests on residuals; two sectors have 
neither concentration by market share nor import penetration by market 
share which are significant j and for the remaining seven sectors, one or 
both variables are significant. Four sectors evidence a significant 
coefficient on CRts1t, three with a negative sign and one with a positive 
sign; and four have a significant coefficient on IMPtsit, three with a 
positive sign and one with a negative sign. Therefore, only one sector 
(Industrial Machinery) has the positive expected sign on CRtsit and 
another sector (Metallic Products) has the expected negative sign on 
IMPtsit" These could be due to problems on variables: concentration is 
constructed by the INE, using the "Encuesta Industrial") and the unit is 
the establishment instead of the firm; import penetration is not available 
for the disaggregation level used for the rest of the variables, but only 
at a more aggregate level. 
6.6 Inclusion of import penetration instead of time dummy variables 
When import penetration is introduced instead of time dummy 
variables, first order serial correlation decreases and second order 
correlation increases for most of the industries: the model needs the 
inclusion of time dummies. Four of the twelve sectors have acceptable 
equations. For one sector, Metallic Products, import penetration has a 
negative sign, indicating that profits are negatively related to import 
penetration: an increase in competition lowers the profits of domestic 
firms. For three sectors, Meat Products, Paper and Plastic and Rubbers, 
import penetration has a positive sign, indicating a positive correlation 
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between profitability and import penetration; this fact could be indicating 
that high profits for domestic firms are attracting import penetration. 
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper presents estimated profit equations for 22 Spanish 
manufacturing industries over the period 1985-1989. Oligopoly theory is 
used to propose empirical regularities for testing. 
Results show heterogeneous behaviour across industries, due to 
individual idiosyncrasies. For some industries, static models of oligopoly 
are rejected by the data: a more complicated model is required to explain 
the determinants of firm-level margins. 
For ten sectors it was not possible to obtain an empirically 
acceptable equation; that may be due to the industry being too 
heterogeneous, or not in the long-run equilibrium. Estimated models for 
the other twelve sectors suggest: 
- Profitability is positively correlated with market share for 36.4% of 
industries, and negatively correlated for 18.2%. Therefore J within 
particular manufacturing industries, profitability is not positively 
correlated to market share, as observed with data from US and UK. 
- The coefficient on market share changes over time in eight 
industries. For five of them, results suggest that demand elasticity is 
constant, so that changes in the coefficient could be a result of 
changes in the number of firms in the industry, concentration or import 
penetration, but it could be suggesting that a dynamic model is 
required to analyze firm-level profitability. 
- Conjectural variations depend on market share in eleven sectors. 
Three of them support the Stigler hypothesis that small firms have 
lower risk of detection than large firms when deviating from a market 
agreement, and therefore lower conjectural variations, while six 
sectors support the Clarke and Davies hypothesis that large firms have 
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smaller conjectural variations than their smaller rivals. For the 
remaining two sectors, the sign of the coefficients changes over time. 
- The average collusiveness for Spanish industries is low over the 
period considered: estimated conjectural variations are closer to 
Cournot behaviour than to joint profit maxirnization. 
The main drawbacks of this paper are, first, the proxy used for 
price-cost margins to measure profitability; while widely used in empirical 
studies of structure and performance, the new empirical industrial 
organization literature points out that price-cost margins are not 
observable, since economic marginal cost cannot be directly observed; 
and, further, the "ad hoc" specification used to proxy firm conjectural 
variations. The results presented in this paper should be considered only 
as empirical regularities of use for guiding theory constructioI.l and 
analysis of particular industries. 
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DATA APPENDIX 
1. The data 
This study uses data from the "Central de Balances del Banco de 
Espaiia" (CBBE), from the "Encuesta Industrial" (El) and from the 
"Direcci6n General de Aduanas e Impuestos Especiales" (DGAIE). 
Variables are defined as follows. 
- PCM1 :;; Price-cost margin 
The price-cost margin is defined as 
Value of Production, - Payroll, - Costs of Materials, 
PCM, = --------::::-:------:c-=-:---:-:--------­
Value of Production! 
where 
Value of Production:; Value of Sales + 
+ .6. Final Products Inventories 
Cost of Materials:; Value of Acquisitions + 
+ & Materials Inventories 
Source: CBBE 
- �JVp, = Capital Output Ratio 
The capital output ratio is defined as 
K, Capital Stock, 
VP 1 Value of Production! 
Following Hernando and Valles (1991) and Salinger and Summers (1983 ) ,  
replacement cost of capital Kt Is defined as 
Kt = It + (Pt IPt_l) Kt_l ( 1  - 6) 
where 
-It. = Gross Investment on Property, Plant and Equipment 
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Source: CBBE 
-Pi = Implicit Price Deflator of fixed capital 
Source: "Contabilidad Nacional" 
-6 :;:; Depreciation Rate;; lover useful life, L·, defined as 
L' • .!. (I:. IIook. Valw Propll'tJ. 1'l41li, Eqlliplnent._1 • Accwrudaud � Book V4lIu!t-1) T -2 IJDot. lkpr«:lDtimI, 
where 1 is the first year available and T the last one. 
Source= CBBE 
Capital stock for 1983 is assumed to be equal to book value, given that a 
process of balance sheet revaluation was allowed in 1983 . For firms whose 
data start after 1 983, capital stock for the first year available (I) is 
obtained multiplying book value by the rate of inflation for capital goods 
between 1983 and I, if useful life is greater than 1-1983. 
- �1 ;; firm i's market share 
Firm ils market share in industry j is defined as VPi/VP" where 
-vp 1:;:; Firm ils Value of Production 
Source: CBBE 
-VPj :;:; Firm j's Value of production 
Source: El 
- CRj :;:; Industry jls Concentration 
Industry j's concentration is constructed by the INE using El, and is 
defined as the value of production for the five biggest establishments in 
sector j. 
Source: INE 
- IMPj = Industry jls Import Penetration 
Industry jls import penetration is defined as imports over domestic 
consumption, 
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Importsj 
Value of Productionj + Importsj - Exportsj 
Source: Imports and Exports, DGAIE 
Value of Production, El 
2. Data Selectionll 
The initial data set is an incomplete panel of 2 , 1 23 firms that had 
answered for five consecutive years the questionnaire sent by the 
"Central de Balances del Banco de Espafia" over the period 1982-90. 
These firms are private firms, with more than 50% of production in non­
energy manufacturing sectors. Some tests were performed on these firms, 
in order to obtain a subset of operating firms (for example, firms with 
value of production equal to zero for any year were eliminated), with time 
consistent data (for example, firms for which capital stock varies more 
than three times net capital stock were eliminated). These tests eliminated 
317 firms. The 1 ,806 remaining firms were classified by sector; first, a 73 
sector classification based on that used by El was tried12, but for a 
subset of firms, different sectors were reported in different years even 
if no appreciable changes on value of production or capital stock were 
observed that would have indicated a change of activity. Therefore, 
based on a one by one inspection, some sectors we"'''' "'ggregated, and 
1 ,396 single-activity firms are finally used in the paJ 'r, belonging to 54 
sectors. 
II A more detailed description of data selection can be found in Maz6n ( 1993 ) . 
12 El offers a 90 sector classification; 81 correspond to non-energy 
manufacturing sectors, but eight of them require a four digit IIClasificaci6n 
Nacional de Bienes y Servicios" (CNBS) disaggregation when only three digits are 
reported by CBBE. 
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Table 2 (bie) 
Estimated models of fLrm profitability. Dependent variable, PCKit 
Induatry I Metallic I Bleetronic I Paper I Plastic and Products Materials Rubbers 
Hax.No.P'irm& 127 21 4S 77 
No.Oblt. S47 OS 211 330 
K/VP 0.01(0) -1.15(-5.6) -0.03(-0) -0.08(-1.4) 
s 
.SS -22.37(-0.9) -15.64(-6.8) 9.09(1.3) 17.90(4.8) 
sS, -42.76{-1.0) -14.95(0.1) -11.25(-2.2) 25.37(0.7) 
aS7 -26.26(-0.2) -12.32(0.8) -3.66(-1.5) -8.39(-5.0) 
.SS 13.45(2.2) -9.27(1.9) -55.76(-6.1) -7.97(-3.8) 
.SO -34.30(-0.5) -10.24(0.8) -13.07(-4.2) 0.59(-2.1) 
.' 540.6{2.03} 43.03(1.9) 166.49(4.2) 
.' SS -127.50(-3.6) 
• , S, -55.94 (1.1) 
. ' S7 39.00(4.5) 
.' SS 38.66(3.9) 
.' SO 23.71(3.6) 
Wa1d .hdt 79.6(4) 19.3(4) 42.7(4) 
Wald dt 13 .4(5) 55.8(5) 52.3(5) 27.8(4) 
Sargan 24.3(17) 2.6(3) 17.9(17) 14.17(13) 
rn1 -3.311 -2.074 -2.250 -2.531 
rn2 0.227 1.086 -0.579 -0.006 
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Table 3 
Industries for which no acceptable model is estimated 
..... • 0. of firms 
Pharmaceutical .3 
Textiles 127 
Electric Machinery 53 
Clothing 4. 
Motor Vehicles 52 
Ceramics 42 
Cement and Derivates 22 
Wine 2. 
Non Alcoholic Drinks 21 
Wood Industries 29 
- 25 -
Table 4 
BatiJllated .. aluea of (1 ... l:> I Et, and joint profit -.u:iai&atiol'l and COUrnot 
Valu811 
Batialated <, � 1 1 ... l: 
--- when 
( '  ::�l <, Joint If -.u: - 100 Joint If -.u: Coor�' (l Is:, and Cournot .. 1 I <, l/E� 
Consumer Chemicals 16.4 290.3 1 • • •  
Industrial Chemicals 2 2 . 7  209.4 1 2 0 . 7  
Industrial Machinery 64 . 7  364 . 9  1 17 . 7  
Graphic Arts 2 3 . 8  337 . 5  1 7 . 1  
Vegetable Product. 34 . 5  150.2 1 2 3 . 0  
Leather 1 8 . 9  1 0 6 . 2  1 17.0 
Footwear 5 3 . 8  562 . 5  1 g . '  
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